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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent i

Priority 2

vs.
GERALD GLEN BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870150

BBIEF_QF_RE£P£NDENT
!lUBISDICTIQN_AND_NATyBE-.QF_CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted second
degree murder, a second degree felony, and aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony, in the Fourth District Court.

This Court

has jurisdiction to review this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (h) (1987).
STATEM£NT_Q£_I££I2££
1.

Do the direct filing and recall provisions of the

juvenile code violate equal protection under either the federal
or state constitutions by treating similarly situated persons
differently without a valid State interest?
2.

Did defendant waive the issue of the

constitutionality of the juvenile court recall provisions under
the Due Process Clause by failing to directly appeal from the
final order of the juvenile court refusing to recall the case?
3.

Does the legislature's grant of authority to Youth

Corrections to review a decision of the trial court to remand a
juvenile offender convicted as an adult to the jurisdiction of
Youth Corrections infringe upon judicial power?

4.

Is the crime of aggravated robbery a lesser

included offense of attempted intentional second degree murder
thus precluding a conviction for both crimes?
5.

Did the trial court err in granting the State's

motion to amend the information to conform to the stipulated
facts and the verdict of the court after the verdict was
rendered?
5TMEMENT_PF-.TH£_5ASJ5
The State initially charged defendant, a seventeen year
oldf in the Fourth District Court with aggravated robbery and two
counts of attempted first degree murder (R. 5-6). Judge Lewis
Trevort refused to recall jurisdiction over defendant to the
juvenile court on October 24, 1986 (R. 79). The information was
amended three times, eventually charging defendant with attempted
intentional second degree murder and aggravated robbery (R. 151).
Defendant waived a jury trial and stipulated to the facts of the
crimes (R. 98-106).

Judge George E. Ballif, found defendant

guilty of both charges on February 6, 1987 (R. 117). Judge
Ballif sentenced defendant to a one-to-fifteen-year term in the
Utah State Prison for attempted second degree murder and to a
five-to-life term for aggravated robbery (R. 166-67) .

The State agrees with the statement of facts set forth
in the appellant's brief except for the last two paragraphs which
represent argument rather than statements of fact.

The facts

were stipulated to in the trial court (R. 103-06).

A copy of the

trial court's findings of fact (R. 111-17), entitled "Ruling", is
included in the addendum to appellant's brief.

I.

Review of defendants equal protection claim

regarding the juvenile direct filing statute does not require
strict scrutiny but must only meet the rational basis test.
Under this test, prosecutorial discretion has been upheld in
other courts and should be similarly upheld here.
II.

Defendant waived his potential due process claims

regarding the juvenile court refusal to recall jurisdiction of
his case by failing to directly appeal the juvenile court order
which was a finalf appealable order.

Jurisdiction over such

appeals lies with the juvenile court, not this Court and
defendant should not be allowed to circumvent the normal
appellate process.
III.

The legislature's delegation of authority to the

Division of Youth Corrections to review placement of juveniles in
the juvenile system after conviction in the district court as an
adult does not improperly infringe upon judicial power.

Rather

it is an appropriate delegation of legislative power.
IV.

Defendants claim that he could not be convicted

of both attempted second degree murder and aggravated robbery is
moot if this Court upholds the amended information.

Even if

defendant was convicted of attempted felony murder, he could also
be convicted of a completed aggravated robbery under the facts of
this case because proof of the attempted murder does not
necessarily include proof of a completed aggravated robbery.
V.

Defendant's substantial rights were unaffected by

the amended information and there was no double jeopardy
violation when the information was amended after verdict.

ARGUMSUJ

THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION TO DIRECT FILE
IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND BYPASS JUVENILE
COURT CERTIFICATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-25(6)
(1987) violates the equal protection clauses of both the federal
and state constitutions because it allows prosecutors to treat
similarly situated persons differently.

He further urges this

Court to apply a strict scrutiny method of review on appeal
because he concludes that the statute impugns the right to
personal liberty, which he claims is a fundamental right.

Upon

review, this Court should find that defendant was not denied
equal protection of the law because of his treatment in the
direct filing system rather than the juvenile certification
system.
First, it is important that "a juvenile offender has no
right to a certification hearing before being prosecuted as an
adult."

BuiDljjaiD^Y^-H^yjtf^xiJ, 663 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1983), citing

In-L£-b£Qh&&QIli

575 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1978).

Thus, defendant

cannot claim that he had a right to treatment as a juvenile.
"Since one does not have an inherent right to be prosecuted as a
juvenile but that is a privilege granted by the legislature, the
legislature can restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit,
so long as there is not involved any arbitrary or discriminatory
classification."

aahnk&-XjL-&tet&*

citing »SfidKAEd-XjL_V&iBMXisht#

692 P.2d 911, 929 (Wyo. 1984),

556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th cir. 1977).

The United States Supreme Court has stated that, in
general, prosecutorial discretion whether and how to charge
crimes does not violate equal protection so long as the decision
is not based upon an unjustifiable standard or an arbitrary
classification such as race or religion.
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).

Bordenkircher v. Hayes.

The Utah Legislature has vested

discretion in the prosecutor to decide what charges to file and
in what court to file them in cases such as this one.

Although

judicial review might be justified if the decision of the
prosecutor were based on suspect factors such as race, religion
or some other arbitrary classification, there is no equal
protection violation in the absence of such factors.

JahnJsfif 692

P.2d at 929, fiiiins UDii£3_Si3Jt£S_y*_Bl3Hd, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337
(U.S.App.D.C. 1972); P£fipl£_yA_Thj?ip£, 641 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo.
1982) .
Defendant claims that the state must have a compelling
interest in treating him differently than juveniles who are
initially charged in the juvenile system and later certified to
the district court based upon his erroneous assumption that
physical liberty is a fundamental right and that any statute that
may ultimately affect physical liberty must pass strict scrutiny.
If this were true, every criminal statute would be entitled to
strict scrutiny whenever it was challenged on equal protection
grounds.

Even a fundamental right is not necessarily subjected

to strict scrutiny.

Ljansaeyfii_ijL_S.tfl.tfi§ 656 P.2d 114, 116 (Idaho

1982) CJLtlflS jS£SDfl_Y__I_*Mfl# 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975), c.f., Wfills

x±-GbiiaL£nLa-bia-&QGi&&-.Qt-Uteh,

681 p.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984)

(upholding statute affecting fundamental parental rights under
rational basis review)•

Consequently, the state need only have a

rational basis for treating juveniles over the age of 16, charged
with attempted second degree murder and other enumerated crimes,
differently than juveniles charged with other crimes. j§ifii.e_YjL
BiSbSPr 717 P.2d 261, 266 (Utah 1986).
Since, the appropriate standard of review in this case
is not strict scrutiny, requiring a precisely tailored statute
serving a compelling state interest as defendant claims, but is
the regular equal protection standard of a rational basis for the
distinction, the question is whether the legislature has a
rational basis for treating juveniles within the class
differently.

The basis here is that persons who have committed

the serious crimes enumerated will likely require lengthy
supervision and are clearly a threat to public safety.

Since the

juvenile system loses jurisdiction over an offender at age 21,
persons 16 or older may be more appropriately dealt with in the
adult system that contemplates lengthier supervision.

Defendant

concedes that the state has a compelling interest of protection
of the public in treating certain juvenile offenders, such as
defendant, differently.

Brief of App. at 17.

He merely claims

that it is the prosecutorial discretion that is objectionable
because it is too broad.

As can be seen from the argument above,

such discretion does not violate equal protection.

SS£ 3lSQ In

Xfi-BjLfi*, 733 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Colo. 1987); StaXs^^hn^SLSQL,
P.2d 76, 80 (Idaho App. 1985);

700

S£ate-&X-L£ljL-GQa£S-XjL-Bak&B£ia*li

610 P.2d 256, 259 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); 2sme£-X±-S£a££e
P.2d 1080, 1083 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).

654

Defendant contends that juveniles over 16 may be
treated in radically different manners under § 78-3a-25(6).

This

claim is not founded in a reasonable interpretation of the
statute.

A person who is directly filed against in the district

court still has the opportunity to be treated in the juvenile
system under the recall statute.

The juvenile court is notified

of the direct filing and may recall jurisdiction in appropriate
cases.

There is little risk that a prosecutor would improperly

prosecute a juvenile who could be more appropriately dealt with
in the juvenile system.

In factr should the juvenile be

recalled, he may still be certified to the district court under
§ 78-3a-25(9).

The recall provision actually functions as a

safety valve in a system where the legislature could as easily
have mandated treatment as an adult for juveniles fitting the
criteria for direct filing since they have no right to treatment
as a juvenile. Ifl_l£_&.fc£l)£S3Il# 575 P.2d at 184.
Because S 78-3a-25 does not create an arbitrary
classification and is based upon a reasonable state interest, it
is constitutional and defendant was not denied equal protection
by the direct filing procedure.

DEFENDANT WAIVED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
JUVENILE COURT RECALL HEARING PROVISIONS
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO APPEAL
FROM THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINAL ORDER
REFUSING TO RECALL THE CASE.
Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the crimes.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6) (1987) allows the prosecutor to
directly file criminal charges in the district court against a

juvenile who is 16 years old at the time he commits certain
enumerated crimes subject to recall of jurisdiction by the
juvenile court.

Defendant claims that he was denied due process

by the recall hearing process because the statute does not
provide for adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard.
Defendant waived this claim by failing to appeal from the
juvenile court order denying recall.
This Court has previously held that a juvenile court
order certifying a juvenile to the district court for trial as an
adult is a final appealable order.
(Utah 1978).

In Re Atchq^QQ, 57 5 P.2d 181

Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a

decision of the juvenile court not to recall jurisdiction under
§ 78-3a-25(9) is a final appealable order under the same
reasoning.

See Order on Petition for Permission to Appeal, ID_RS

£y£dr case no. 880108-CA, attached as Appendix A.

Because the

order denying recall in this case was a final appealable order,
defendant should have taken a direct appeal from the juvenile
court order and may not now circumvent the regular appellate
process by using his motion to dismiss in the trial court as a
basis for this Court's review of these issues.
This reasoning is sound because the juvenile court
record is not a part of the record before this Court.

Review of

this record would be critical in any attempt by this Court to
examine the constitutionality of the process defendant received.
To show that he was denied due process, defendant is required to
establish that the process he actually received was inadequate,
not simply that, under some interpretation of the statute, a

person could hypothetically be denied due process.

In re

ClalifilbUClS # 700 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ; S i a t f i - ^ - B i c h l D f i n d ,

570,

1014 (Ore. C t . App. 1 9 7 7 ) ; SJt3Jtje_2jL_LiJtil£, 407 P.2d 6 2 7 , 631

(Ore. 1965).
POINT III
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN S 7 8-3a-25(8) REQUIRING APPROVAL OF THE
DIVISION OF YOUTH CORRECTIONS BEFORE DEFENDANT
COULD BE COMMITTED TO THEIR CUSTODY.
Defendant claims that conditioning any remand at
sentencing to the custody of Youth Corrections by the district
court on approval of the Division of Youth Corrections violates
Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.

He argues that

the ability of Youth Corrections to reject a remand to their
jurisdiction infringes upon the power of the judiciary to impose
sentences.

However, defendant fails to recognize that it is

within the power of the legislature to determine the appropriate
sentencing alternatives that will be available to judges. Thus,
it is not the power of the judiciary that is infringed in this
instance, rather it is that the legislature has delegated to the
Division of Youth Corrections the power to determine the
appropriate placement of juveniles in the interest of the
juvenile and the public.

The issue then, is whether the

legislature could properly delegate to the executive branch the
discretion to choose the appropriate placement of juveniles on an
individual basis rather than mandating itself that all juveniles
tried as adults be treated in any particular manner.
Here, the legislature could properly delegate the power
to Youth Corrections to evaluate, using their expertise in the

field and based upon individual cases, whether a particular
juvenile convicted in the adult court should nevertheless be
placed in juvenile programs at sentencing.

Article V f section 1

of the Utah Constitution does not forbid all delegations of power
by the legislature to an executive branch.
P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977).

State v. Gallion, 572

The legislature may lawfully empower

state agencies to administer their policies "and may confer upon
[them] certain powers and the duty of determining the question of
the existence of certain facts upon which the effect or execution
of its legislative policy may be dependent."

!£• at 687, aufliina

ClaX&Qn-XjL-BsnafiJLt, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531, 535 (1956)
(other citation omitted).
All that the legislature has done in this instance is
to give to Youth Corrections the power to implement its policy of
treating appropriate juvenile candidates in the juvenile system
even after conviction in the adult criminal system.

For this

reason, the delegation of authority is appropriate and
constitutional.
In any event, defendant lacks standing to challenge
this portion of the statute because he was not referred to Youth
Corrections after sentencing.

In this case the district court

judge did not feel it was appropriate to refer defendant to Youth
Corrections and chose to sentence him as an adult.

Defendant's

sentence and subsequent placement did not, therefore, hinge upon
approval by the Division of Youth Corrections.

He should not be

heard to complain that someone might be prejudiced by the
Division'8 hypothetical actions where he was not prejudiced by
any such actions*

£QItf£_I¥
THIS COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER WHETHER DEFENDANT
COULD BE CONVICTED OF BOTH ATTEMPTED FELONY
MURDER AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY SINCE DEFENDANT
WAS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED INTENTIONAL MURDER,
BUT EVEN IF DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED
FELONY MURDER HE COULD ALSO BE CONVICTED OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
Defendant asserts that the trial court should have
granted his motion to correct his sentence to void his separate
sentences for attempted second degree murder and aggravated
robbery.

He explains that aggravated robbery is an included

offense of felony murder and that he could not be convicted for
both crimes under $£ai,£_Xj>.„£hattSLr

725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).

Defendant fails to recognize, however, that since he was
convicted of attempted intentional murder not felony murder, his
argument is moot.
Even if this Court were to find that defendant should
have been convicted of attempted felony murder instead of
attempted intentional murder because the information was
improperly amended (see Point V below), a completed aggravated
burglary is not an included offense of attempted felony murder.
The elements of attempted felony murder require that a person,
having the mental state necessary to commit the crime, take a
substantial step towards commission of the crime.
S 76-4-101(1) (1978).

Utah Code Ann.

A substantial step toward commission of

felony murder does not require a completed aggravated robbery.
An attempted robbery, while armed, would be sufficient to satisfy
the substantial step required here.

Where, as in this case, a defendant is charged with a
completed aggravated robbery (see Third Amended Information,
Appendix B ) , and attempted felony murder, both convictions may
stand because proof of the completed aggravated robbery would not
necessarily be required to prove attempted felony murder. For
this reason, aggravated robbery is not, under the facts of this
case, an included offense of attempted second degree murder.
Finally, even if the two crimes did merge as defendant
asserts, it would be inappropriate to reward defendant with a
sentence on the third degree felony attempted second degree
murder only and strike the greater sentence for the first degree
felony aggravated robbery.

At the least, defendant should be

required to serve the sentence that is legislatively imposed for
the greater degree of crime rather than for the lesser.

AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AFTER THE COURT
ANNOUNCED ITS VERDICT WAS NOT A DOUBLE JEOPARDY
VIOLATION.
Defendant claims that the State's amendment of the
information after the verdict violated the federal and state
double jeopardy and due process clauses and Utah Code Ann.
S 77-35-4 (1982).

The amendment was, however, proper and

violated none of the defendant's rights*
Defendant was initially charged with attempted first
degree murder, intentional offense, and went through preliminary
bearing on that charge.

Later, the State amended the charge to

attempted second degree felony murder, the defendant pled not
guilty and both parties stipulated to the facts of the crime.

The stipulation includes facts upon which the judge, as trier of
fact, could have found that defendant intentionally shot Ms.
Penney (see Stipulation at R. 104-105).

Defendant stipulated

that it required some conscious act of pointing the gun and
pulling back on both the hammer and the trigger to shoot Ms.
Penney and the trial court found, based upon these facts that
defendant intended to shoot Ms. Penney (see Ruling at R. 115) .
Based upon the court's finding an intentional act, the State
moved to amend the information and the court granted the motion.
While S 77-35-4 discusses amendments prior to verdict
and allows for certain amendments after verdict, it does not
specifically preclude other types of amendments.

The State's use

of subsection (d) to justify its motion does not require that
this court reverse the trial court if there were other proper
grounds for the amendment.

5ia.tfi_AU_Bxy.ailr 709 P.2d 257 (Utah

1985) .
This Court has not previously addressed the issue of
amendments to informations after verdict.

Nevertheless, the

cases cited by defendant as being inapposite because they address
pre-verdict amendments are instructive on the appropriate
standard of review even for post-verdict amendments.
ElQQli

£Jtai___*

655 P.2d 690 (Utah 1980) and £_a____--£_-£-S_*n r 681 P.2d

1210 (Utah 1984), allow pre-verdict amendments where a
defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced and no new
offense is charged.

This standard is similar to one employed by

Colorado in Pfiflplfi____iSthn&QU*

644 P.2d 34, 37 (Colo* App. 1980)

a_Ild 3Uh Afi_u GimW-XjL-.2&Q2l&*

645 P.2d 262 (1982) (affirmed on

other grounds) which disallowed a post-verdict amendment of an
information that prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights.
The issue here, then, is whether defendant's
substantial rights were affected by the amendment.

Because

defendant stipulated to the facts supporting the judge's
findings, noted that the issue at trial would have been whether
he possessed intent to shoot Ms* Penney (T. dtd. 2-4-87 at 12,
18-24), and was not convicted of any different offense than the
one charged, his rights were not prejudiced.
Defendant claims that his rights were prejudiced
because he was not given adequate notice of the charge and
because his conviction violated double jeopardy.

However,

defendant was prepared for and made an argument attempting to
negate intent.

He claimed that the gun could be fired

accidentally and that it was fired accidentally (T. dtd. 2-4-87
at 33) .
Nor was defendant subjected to double jeopardy for he
was convicted of attempted second degree murder only once. The
amendment did not result in two convictions for the same offense
nor did he receive multiple punishments for attempted second
degree murder.

Here, as in Peterson* defendant was not

prejudiced by the shift from one subsection of the second degree
murder statute to another subsection and the amendment should
stand.

Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the decision of the district court.
DATED this

day of
^

-

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

'4&£gzaomaL

NDRA L .

sistant

A-lftorYiey'General

MAILING_CER2IEICA1E
I hereby c e r t i f y

t h a t on the

A.
day of May, 1988, I
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to M. Cort
Griffin, 110 South Main Street, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062.

APPENDIX A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

State of Utah,
in the interest of

ORDER ON PETITION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL

Nicholas Hans Byrd

Case No. 880108-CA

Before Judges Jackson, Davidson and Greenwood (On Law and Motion).

This matter is before the Court on the Petition for
Permission to Appeal filed by defendant Nicholas Hans Byrd
pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This
Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties, and concludes
that the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Recall
Jurisdiction and the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to
Declare Section 78-3a-25(6) and (9) Unconstitutional constitute
the final orders of the Second District Juvenile Court
terminating the jurisdiction of that Court. The orders are not
interlocutory and constitute final, appealable orders under the
reasoning set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State In Re
AtCheSOn, 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Permission to
Appeal is denied
because the orders being appealed from are not
interlocutory.1
DATED this J*3

day of March, 1988.

FOR THE COURT:

rxman H. Jack
1. In a letter dated March 16, 1988, appellant's counsel advised
this Court that he also filed a direct appeal from the orders of
the Second District Juvenile Court "to protect Mr. Byrd9s rights
in the event that this Court determined that [the Juvenile
Court's] decision was indeed the final order in this case forever
divesting the juvenile court of jurisdiction.* Counsel concedes
that in such event, an interlocutory appeal would be
unnecessary. With the denial of the present petition for
interlocutory appeal, all further proceedings will be in the
direct appeal docketed as Case No. 88-0160-CA.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.

THIRD AMENDED
INFORMATION

vs.
GERALD GLEN BELL,
Defendant.
DOB - 10/03/69

#1005

The undersigned, under oath, states on information and
belief that the Defendant on or about the 13th of October,
1986 in Millard County, State of Utah committed the crimes
of ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE HOMOCIDE, a Second Degree Felony
and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony as follows:
COUNT #1 - ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE HOMOCIDE
In that the Defendant, acting with the intent to cause the
death of another, to wit; Carley Johnson Penney, did engage
in conduct constituting a substantial step towards causing
the death of the said Carley Johnson Penney in violation of
U.C.A.76-5-203(1)(a) and 76-4-101(1), a Second Degree Felony
pursuant to U.C.A.76-5-203(2) AND 76-4-102(2).
COUNT «2 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
In that the Defendant did unlawfully and intentionally take
property, to wit; 2 packs of cigarettes, 6 cans Mountain Dew
soda pop and 13 gallons of gasoline from the person in
possession of said property by means of force and during
said robbery, the Defendant did use a firearm, to wit; a .22
caliber revolver, a First Degree Felony in violation of
U.C.A.76-6-302.

This Information is based on evidence obtained from the
Carley Johnson Penney
following witnesses:
Det. Robert Dekker
Sheriff Ed Phillips
Deputy Dan Rowley
rpt*ty James W. Masner

Authorized for presentand filing:

Subscribed and sworrv^to
before me this _ / J _ d a y
of H**cfc, 1987.

